Control of armies, police and parties delivers hard power in the 'state of exception' illustrated by civil war in Nepal. The history of Nepal nevertheless shows how in revolutionary conditions, the crowd can be decisive to advance equality. Soft people power is mostly superior for advancing egalitarian agendas than hard power. Yet momentary people power must grapple with ancient, entrenched, material power. While ethnic or religious groups sometimes create armies, political parties, states within a federation, women do not create such institutions of hard power. Deft vernacularisation of women's rights, LGBT [i] rights and the rights of Untouchables into the discourses of both Maoist and western hard power delivered some egalitarian shifts. This case reveals how windows of soft power that advance gender and class equality can be widened in the face of resurgence of the hard power of parties, militaries, crony capitalism and foreign capital. Together, window-widening, disciplined nonviolence and vernacularisation to enroll hard power can deliver transformations that favour the marginalised.
were also widespread in the People's Liberation Army. They are not the focus of this analysis, though the conclusion turns to how their engagement with armed struggle adds complexity to the analysis.
The point is not to essentialise these categories of disadvantage. Some children are Dalits, some inter-gendered. Children at one phase of this historical narrative are adults at a later phase. Some 'caste' identities were ethnic identities before Hindu elites fleeing the Mughal advance five centuries ago imposed a more totalising caste system on Nepal. Getting categories of essentialised disadvantage clear or right is not the objective. What is important here is to use shifting configurations of disadvantage to reveal the power of suites of mechanisms of struggle. These may prove of relevance to varieties of disadvantage that take different forms in different historical contexts.
It is far from the purpose of this article to dampen a politics of hope grounded in inspiration that can be derived from the liberation struggles of women, LGBTs and Dalits in Nepal. Rather, it seeks to draw both positive lessons about those successes and lessons, and about the extra ingredients needed to consolidate gains. Before this can be accomplished, however, we must learn what gave resilience to male power, upper caste power, the power of established political parties and armed groups to push back the gains of the revolutionary moment for the most disadvantaged groups.
We discover that both hard power -control of organisations that can mobilise the coercive power of guns and money -and soft power are important to understanding the history of Nepal. Entrenched rulers and powerless groups alike are most effective when they wield soft power (Nye 2004) . Soft 3 WORKING PAPER RegNet Research Papers power aims to persuade rather than punish or coerce to achieve change. Yet the comparative advantage of entrenched rulers over the powerless is widest with hard power. Hegemony is the most potent form of soft power -where the dominated come to support their domination. Hard power also constitutes a formidable hegemonic advantage in soft power for rulers.
1 Even so, 'the crowd in history' (Rudé 1964) has clout. Though it is systematically true that the poor win symbolic rewards from conflicts while the rich win material rewards (Edelman 1967) , symbolic politics, particularly the politics of vernacularisation (Merry 2006) , can allow the weak to harness the power of the strong. The weak often divide and conquer the strong through astute mobilisation of soft power. This essay is about how this accomplishment can be secured and strengthened.
Preliminary conclusions from the Nepal transformation are advanced as hypotheses to guide future research:
1. The most decisive factor in Nepal's republican revolution was a triumph of nonviolent people power on the streets, enabled by a unilateral Maoist ceasefire that brought masses of people in behind the Maoists in 2006. Behind the scenes of this people power lurked hegemonic male power of armies, parties, foreign states and upper castes. 
Women,
LGBTs and Dalits could succeed in deploying strategic vernaculars to ride the wave of people power. As the revolutionary moment fades, however, people power is captured by elites who control the most potent forms of organisational power -armies, parties, executive governments, capital. Women and maximally disadvantaged class groups like Dalits never win revolutions in the long run of history because they never secure majority control of armies, parties, executive governments and capital. This contrasts with religious groups, ethnic and nationality groups, capitalist shadow governments and groups with particular political ideologies, which routinely control armies, parties, and executive governments (domestic and foreign), with support from only fractions of the population. This is partly about spatial concentration of the minorities who grab the most enduring forms of organisational
power. An ethnic, religious or Maoist minority can rise to national power from a base in one 1 Part of this is rulers' control of resources that permits a combination of the soft power of rewards and the soft power of hegemony: 'In Nepal the authorities make you feel shit. If you want your passport, they look at you like you are shit. So people rely on contacts they have with the military or the police to help them to get something like a passport.' This journalist went on to suggest various modalities of hegemonic power of the military such as being able to suggest to rural people who one would vote for if one had the interests of the people at heart (Kathmandu interview 021447 2014).
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region of a state where it is a dominant majority. Women, Dalits, LGBTs (or children) cannot concentrate spatially to exploit this.
4. Federalism and consocialism as common post-conflict settlements play into this comparative disadvantage. Nepal illustrates how Maoists and other political parties, ethnic parties, organised clutches of crony capitalists, armed groups, even foreign states like India, can win domination in certain provinces of a federation through their deployment of concentrated organisational power. This even though they might fail to secure control of the central state.
Women, LGBTs, Dalits (and children) are not concentrated spatially in ways that allow them to grab a base of provincial power from which they can seize moments of national power.
The dominant parties crafted a distinctively Nepalese informal consocialism (power sharing) that excluded women, LGBTs and Dalits. 4. One way to extend the people power window is to prolong the period when party leaders are in the more original position that prevails before the first post-conflict election.
5. A critical form of institutional entrenchment for women, LGBTs and Dalits is semi-autonomous separations of powers in a polity.
The plan of this paper is nine sections that explore in order the above nine hypotheses. Part II systematically works through hypotheses 1-4; it attempts an explanatory account of how vernaculars of inclusion make headway. Part III systematically works through the activist hypotheses 5-9 using subheadings to inform a normative theory of how to institutionalise equality.
The data that drive the analysis came from extensive reading on the transition in Nepal, including primary source documents, fieldwork mostly in 2014 mostly in Kathmandu and rural Rolpa District in the western hills, but also interviews with key UN players, peacekeepers and national diplomats in New York, Delhi, Beijing and elsewhere. 66 informants in total were interviewed, nearly all for more than one hour but less than two, and some on more than one occasion. All interviews were conducted by the author, half of them with a local interpreter, as the Nepal leg of the Peacebuilding Compared data collection (http://regnet.anu.edu.au/peacebuilding-compared/home), a project with wider aims, but one that embraces exploration of the hypotheses explored herein for 32 other armed conflicts to date. My Rolpa interviews suggest that targeted rape may have been the most important reason for the percentage of female fighters being highest there. Because Rolpa District was a first mover into sustained armed conflict that became host to the head quarters of the People's Liberation Army, the security forces targeted daughters, wives and sisters of Maoist fighters particularly savagely with rape. Rolpa was also targeted earlier, by Operation Romeo in November 1995, which drove Maoist men into the forest to escape police atrocities (Gautam, Banskota and Manchanda 2011: 343) . After many men were killed, women stepped in to take their places, partly to avenge family killings and rapes, and partly because they concluded it was better to get up in the hills and fight than wait in the valleys to be raped. Interviews with male and female Maoist fighters in Rolpa and beyond also explained women's participation in terms of an ideology of women's liberation from educational and employment discrimination and landlessness. As feminist Maoist leader Hsila Yami put it: 'Since women have suffered class and sexual oppression they have double the capacity to revolt'; though poignantly also saying 'the People's War give all of them [women] a meaningful life and a meaningful death; it allows them to prove their worth is equal to the men' (Manchanda 2004:241,246 ; see also Menon and Rodgers (2013) showed using three waves of data that the payoff of the conflict was in increased paid female employment -as opposed to dependence on remittances and subsistence work -during the war. Valente (2013) showed that districts that experienced more conflict violence during the Maoist war also had the highest increase in educational attainment of girls during the war.
II. Vernaculars of Inclusion Confront Gender and Class Power

People's power triumphs
Contrary to the negative effects on schooling of war recorded in many other countries, war intensity in
Nepal also increased male educational attainment, though not as strongly or robustly as for females.
This was true even though Maoist abductions of children were found to have a negative effect on educational attainment during the war (Valente 2013:2) . In 2011, only 5 per cent of women over 40
had some secondary education, while 50 per cent of women between 15 and 20 (who mostly entered high school during the war) had some secondary education (Engel et al 2013:27) . One reason was evidence that Maoists, perhaps particularly female ones, policed the problem of teacher absenteeism in remote rural schools and used the People's Courts to confront parents who allowed truancy by their children. During the war, between 1996 and 2006 when a majority of the population came to be under Maoist rural governance, Nepal's maternal mortality ratio fell by 47 per cent (Engel et al 2013:4) , an indicator that normally rises sharply during civil wars. Neonatal mortality, under five mortality and many other health outcomes also improved markedly during the war. Remarkably for a major war, overall life expectancy improved at about twice the rate during the war as the improvement of the previous two decades of peace (Engel et al 2013: 9) . Part of this change was shorter life expectancy for women than men before the war becoming women living longer than men by war's end, a change assisted by a successful female community health volunteers program.
Nepal is a rural economy where landlessness is a dominant driver of poverty. The two demographic groups with the highest rates of landlessness are women and Dalits (Nepali 2008) . Murshed and Gates (2005) found that variation in the intensity of armed conflict across Nepal's 75 districts between 1996 and 2001 was a function of the incidence of landlessness and the Human Development Index.
Macours (2011) shows that Maoist recruitment by abductions of young people to fight was most intense in districts where inequality had widened most between those who owned land and those who did not. Nepal et al (2011) argued that in a village society the village is the best-specified level of analysis for exploring inequality effects, rather than the district or national level. This is because it is groups who must overcome the costly collective action problems to organise for revolt against the state machinery; and in village society, it is at the village level that organisation for collective action is most WORKING PAPER RegNet Research Papers possible. Indeed it is true that the initial attacks on police posts to acquire the insurgency's first weapons did not arise nationally, but as a result of local uprisings in certain villages of the remote districts of Rolpa and Rukum. Nepal et al (2011) found large, robust effects of between-groups inequality explaining resistance, especially inequality between upper and lower castes (and disadvantaged indigenous groups). That is, across 3,857 villages, when between-groups inequality was high, Maoist killings were high. 4 These effects persisted after instrumenting for endogeneity.
Successful vernacularisation of gender and Dalit rights
One of the ways the Maoists were politically sure footed was that when their Maoist rhetoric was failing to mobilise enough fighters to sustain an expanding insurgency, they adopted the vernacular of Another interesting vernacular into which women's voices were translated was that of the democracy movement, more specifically the technical discourse of electoral engineering. Women lobbied intensively for a 'proportional' electoral system rather than 'first past the post'. The final deal was a mixed system where some seats in the Constituent Assembly were selected by first past the post and some by a proportional system. For the proportional seats, parties won seats in proportion to their percentage of the vote; then parties were regulated to select fixed numbers of women from the list of candidates they had put before the electorate. A feminism that was illiterate in the arcane logic of electoral discourse would not have maneuvered as effectively as Nepali feminists to entrench an empowering result constitutionally.
Indigenous groups embraced a discourse of federalism. This was also a continuity and a re- A distinctive feature of this rural feminism is that it liked the way People's Courts, in which one third of the judges and advocates were women, cracked down on domestic violence during the People's War.
Onasari Gharti, a Commissar in Rolpa who became a Minister and the most senior Maoist woman in the parliament said:
Women got more justice than they get today. During the People's War they got speedier justice in the People's Courts. The meeting would be held quickly. There was a lot of participation of women in the People's Courts. A lot more participation of women in many things during the war. In the People's Court the advocates and judges were frequently women. This was because the judges were elected in the village. Judges would go to a victim's place in the village as a mobile team to listen to the victim before the court case began. The people liked that. The court would sometimes give them labor as punishment and they would get counseling during their labor. There were two kinds of labor punishment, one that involves doing something for the victim's house itself, the other kind involved social development work. Maintaining social harmony was important to the court (Kathmandu interview 031405).
Maoist justice mostly simply confronted domestic violence and extracted undertakings for desistance by perpetrators, combined with monitoring by relatives, and reporting desistance back to the People's Government. Sometimes reform of perpetrators was promoted through work for the community, sometimes even forcing some abusive husbands 'to perform household chores they traditionally never touched' (Sharma and Prasain 2004:157) , and sometimes procedurally rough justice in which perpetrators were beaten or had an extra bag of rice taken off them by feminists of the People's Revolutionary Army. Of course, this rural feminist-Maoist justice was unattractive to the metropolitan feminist justice of the legality of courts and prisons. During the war there were many women involved in the People's Courts. They provided good justice. Women could take domestic violence cases for a fair hearing for the first time. Today the situation is even better but has a long way to go still. It's better because there is a choice of access to government courts and there is better access to the village justice. It has more women than before when it had none. That is thanks to our struggle. Justice is also better today because of the rights. The rights get more protection in the courts but there are also other rights in the village mediation. The rights has been a good thing for women (Rolpa interview 031433).
That said, as Rita Manchanda (2004:2) 
Resilience of male and Brahmin power
We have already seen how, at the moment of cantonment, Maoist leaders who no longer depended Dalit judges, cabinet ministers or members of the police or army elites (Lawoti 2007:13-14) .
In sum, the wartime and 19-day peoples' movement elevation of women, Dalits and indigenous people to a spring of leadership has now been reversed to gains for these groups only at the lower and middling levels of elite incumbency, though still with very notable advances at these middling levels.
The politics of federalism puts women, LGBTs and Dalits back at the margin
We have seen that ethnic federalism was part of the Maoist inclusion and empowerment agenda. It was not something that benefitted women. Women were half the population of all districts, so there would be no 'women's homeland'. Dalits (13 per cent of the national population) were spread roughly equally across all districts.
LGBTs likewise lacked the geographical concentration for a 'gay and lesbian homeland'. There was actually some determined advocacy for a 'non-territorial' Dalit province in the new federation (Kisan 2012 While women, LGBTs and Dalits can win gains through deploying soft power -vernaculars, symbolic politics, street politics -federalism becomes another way that the hard power of controlling organisations that mobilise guns and money -executive governments, parties, big business, armiesis put beyond their gasp. In contrast, federalism is a path to hard power for ethnic groups that are minorities nationally but large enough to dominate in a particular region. The next paragraph illustrates how it favours larger minorities over smaller ones like Dalits or lesbians. More than that, it illustrates how federalist agendas can mobilise the hard power of foreign states.
The numerically strongest disadvantaged ethnic group, the Madhesi of the south-eastern plains of the Tarai, were also determined to hold the post-conflict parties to the federalist plank of the inclusion agenda. When Madhesi leaders were dissatisfied with the specificity of commitment to federalism in the early drafts of the interim constitution in 2007, they mobilised protests on the streets of Tarai towns. Blockades prevented food and other essentials getting up to Kathmandu. Fifty were killed in these massive mobilisations. They utterly de-stabilised the country. Bloody Tarai protests and blockades occurred again in 2015 over fears of levels of Madhesi representation than it was hoped federal boundaries would provide.
India was supportive of a federalism that it hoped would see the Tarai host powerful pro-Indian provinces dominated by ethnically Indian immigrants on India's border. Because the Tarai is half the population of Nepal, India hoped it might become a politically dominant state that would be a captive of Indian diplomacy. India hoped that payoffs to Tarai provincial politicians would make them facilitative of Indian interests in water resources that flowed through the Tarai down to India (Interviews 031410, 031427). Conversely, India was attracted to a proliferation of tiny ethnic provinces along Nepal's northern border with China. This would best enable the option of destabilising Tibet by providing a Nepalese (provincial) safe haven for Tibetan terrorists or activists. Chinese diplomacy on this was flat footed; Beijing awoke too late to the reality that it had an interest in opposing Nepalese federalism and questioning why India needed a buffer within a buffer (the Tarai) from China (interview 031410). By the time China began its attempts to influence the debate, all the major parties had surrendered to pressure from the Madhesi and other ethnic groups to lock in their commitment to a federalist constitution.
One of the best known interpretations of hard power is the theory of the state of exception. Carl Schmitt (2006 Schmitt ( , 2013 and Giorgio Agamben (2005) 
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as a defence of the Constitution, while the reality can be that it changes the Constitution, legalising detention without trial and torture under that Constitution.
Schmitt and Agamben's work draws us to the importance of the hard power of the state of exception.
In the present analysis, there is much more to military and police power than implementing the state of exception, and more to executive power than ordering it. Militaries and police also exercise a crucial form of power when they disperse the soft power of mass protest legally. They do so when they achieve this hegemonically. An example is when people hide in their homes for fear of provoking It is reasonable to say that while it is inevitable that a federation will never see a women's province, what do exist are feminist political parties, feminist police chiefs, feminist business cooperatives and CEOs. These can be supported. Hence, there is no inevitability that the gendered hard power of state, capital and militaries will never be dominated by feminist agendas. Even so, the lessons of Nepal will be read in Part III as lessons about the superior returns from focusing political energy on the gendered soft power that best advanced equality for women, LGBTs and Dalits.
Moreover, the power of nonviolence is more ethical than violence, the power of persuasion more ethical than bribery with fists of cash, the power of soft inclusion more principled than the exclusion of those without the muscle to demand inclusion. This is the normative turn we now take. There is a connection between the explanatory account above and the normative propositions that follow. This is that ethical nonviolent power can attract wider support for institutional transformation. Chenoweth and
Stephan (2011) show empirically that this is why nonviolent projects of maximalist transformation have twice the success rate of violent ones. If the project is simply to milk institutions rather than transform them, then of course one does not need the broadly based citizen mobilisation of soft power.
III. Toward a Normative Theory of How to Institutionalise Equality
Translate grievances of the marginalised into vernaculars of organisational power
The final paragraph of the last section is about how the soft power of vernacularisation is important because it can enroll hard power. If the big picture is encouraging, at a micro level, the peacemaking and peacebuilding has been dispiriting. Women, leaders of less powerful indigenous and caste groups, were quickly discarded when they were no longer needed to fight a war and depose the king from the streets. Progressively more narrow cliques of upper caste male power were doing the deals. They were in no hurry. The priority for most of them was an incumbency they could use to grow rich and powerful through Two of the most senior women I interviewed argued that more than 50 per cent of the people exercising power on the streets in Kathmandu and across the country in April 2006 were women and that in many protest locales women were the first to dare defy the security forces on the street. 'If we go to the front the men will come in behind' (Women's leader interview 031449 2014). Most male leaders disputed that women were a majority, male peasant movement leaders said peasants were the majority, but all conceded that women were vital to a momentum of the streets the security forces could not stop; none argued that they were fewer than 20-30 per cent of the participants, none Juxtaposed with these more successful post-conflict constitutional transformations, we can see that a key learning from Nepal, moreso from Egypt, is that the first post-conflict election might best have been deferred with an extended transitional national unity government with a dual peacebuilding and Constitution-building mandate.
Build inter-organisational caucuses controlled from the margins
Task the transition government with deep institutionalisation of a separation of powers
The danger in a transition from a monarchy to a republic that has been illustrated many times before Nepal is that Robespierre, Napoleon and Stalin become new kings that Morsi became a new Pharaoh. Robust separations of powers that go beyond the basics of separating an executive from a legislature and a judiciary are needed. A genuinely independent election commission is needed, a human rights commission, an anti-corruption commission, an ombudsman, audit office, business regulatory institutions that do not protect businesses owned by cronies of the party leaders, independent universities, and much more.
One recurrent threat of a dominated polity is posed by the kind of deal making we see in Nepal where control of these institutions is divided up between loyalists of the three large parties to ensure that their checks and balances do not rock any major party's boat. The more common threat is the polity settling to domination of all these institutions by one or two parties. Again, rules of the game for separated powers, for appointment of independent judges, prosecutors, human rights commissioners, military commanders, who are loyal to the Constitution rather than to ruling parties, are most likely to WORKING PAPER
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be resilient when they are deeply and decisively institutionalised during the period of transitional government when party leaders are in a more original position.
For excluded groups, separated powers are not just about checking and balancing the power of institutions dominated by included elites. They are also about separations of powers that require ruling elites to sit at the table with marginalised groups to respond to their grievances. More than that, separated powers are furthermore about giving excluded groups extra options when ruling elites ignore their voicing of grievance. Perhaps they can then take it to the courts, or the Human Rights
Commission and from there to Universal Periodic Review of the nation's human rights record by the UN Human Rights Council. And if the judge that hears their case is corrupted by the system, they can take her to the Anti-Corruption Commission or pressure an independent legal profession to get their professional house in order. Or they can take it back to the streets and to a future election stirred and shaken by impulses from the streets.
Interviews with leaders of the Citizens Movement for Democracy and Peace they discussed how the parties were now seen as controlling everything. If new Commissioners must be appointed to the Human Rights Commission or some other key institution in the separation of powers, major party leaders have a meeting and do a deal: 'We get this Commissioner, you get that one, a third party gets to choose the next one'. Each party places their crony to ensure the institution fails to check its party power. This is a de facto consocialism (Lijphart 1977; Taylor 2009 ) that evolved informally as a postconflict settlement through the power of the major parties, even though the formal voting system was not designed to share power among major parties (but to share it with women, ethnic minorities and disadvantaged castes). This parceling out of positions to dominant party hacks delivers party domination right down to village-level Peace Committees, the effectiveness of which has been greatly compromised by top-down party domination. Other interview informants lamented that Nepal had become a 'partyocracy' and that 'Political parties are the state' (newspaper editor Interview 031410).
Even to get a job as a university professor, Devendra Raj Panday and other intellectual informants argued, you must be acceptable to the party that has captured that university. Because he seemed to be heading there, I asked if another citizens' movement was needed to tame the pervasive domination of the party machines. Panday replied yes, but not yet as it could disrupt the fragile process of finalising a consensus over the Constitution: 'after the Constitution and the truth and reconciliation commission are settled then the movement for cultural transformation of the parties is needed.' (Interview 031415).
IV. Conclusions
Method, contingency, theory
This contribution is partly about reflecting on universals -that feminist armies, feminist political parties, feminist foreign intelligence services never command a state of exception, that feminists never force federalism to deliver control of a government through geographical concentration of 
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Maoists abandoned violence and succeeded in achieving most of their immediate objectives through joining a nonviolent campaign of civilian resistance. This second nonviolent campaign should now be recoded as a success for nonviolent resistance.
Vernacularisation bottom-up and top-down are coded among the more than 700 variables in
Peacebuilding Compared. When the data set, including follow-ups, is complete around 2030, it will be used to assess whether vernacularisation has some explanatory power in explaining post-conflict outcomes across all the world's major wars since 1990. Likewise, we will explore other variables quantitatively on the final 2030 data set to test other theoretical claims in this essay about federalist transformations post-conflict, the timing and sequencing of elections and post-conflict constitutions, the vitality of the separation of powers, the successes of the weak in dividing the strong who control parties, and more.
Normative contingency for weavers of soft and hard power
Does Part III imply that the gains Maoist women made as a result of their hard power to kill should be denounced? Not at all. One can oppose a war; yet when it becomes a fact on the ground, one can decide which side to join, which side promises a more just future and protection of one's children, and oneself from rape. One can be like Nelson Mandela in believing it best to turn the African National
Congress away from armed struggle, while still using those who disagree as a violent radical flank that is a strategic asset in negotiations for peace with justice (Braithwaite 2013) . Facts of already existing hard power cannot be denied by those who struggle softly for justice. They should be woven together with strands of soft power that bind brutal facts into the most justice-enhancing fabric of power possible. This means weaving the most liberating project possible against the background of the facts of hard power. That is why a politics of presence (Phillips 1998) These theoretical insights then ground a suite of tactical insights for egalitarian struggle that are about organisationally disciplined nonviolence, vernacularisation, inter-organisational caucusing by the weak to divide the strong, deferred elections that extend windows of people power, institutionalisation of separations of powers, and model mongering with constitutional reform proposals that can assist disadvantaged ethnic and religious groups with alternatives to federalist and consociational carve-ups of power. We could have selected other disadvantaged groups beyond women, LGBTs and Dalits to reach these conclusions in some ways more strongly with other disadvantaged caste and indigenous groups.
We could have done so more powerfully with children. Children also fought in large numbers in the Maoist army. Because of their greater weakness, they were recruited more coercively than adults, who overwhelmingly volunteered. Children were even more excluded from post-conflict dialogue and logrolling than women, LGBTs and Dalits. No children were appointed even as army Majors. None became party leaders. A 'kid's homeland' was not an option for inclusive federalism. Children's rights have nowhere to go by reliance on hard power. Children's rights vernaculars must enroll hard power in the hands of others.
So the most important argument of this article is that people power on the streets and in mobilising general strikes, blockades and other people power tactics does shape history, as does the symbolic power and the enrollment power of model mongering and vernaculars of empowerment. They do so, however, by shaping the organisational and material might of armies, political parties, capitalist enterprise and executive governments. Nepal is a context that casts a glimmer of hope that this could be child's play.
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